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We study a problem of repeated moral hazard where the eﬀect of eﬀort is persistent over time:
each period’s outcome distribution is a function of a distributed lag of past eﬀorts. We study
ap a r t i c u l a rs p e c i ﬁcation of persistence: the distribution of the outcomes depends on the sum
of discounted eﬀorts. We show that when the utility of the agent is linear in eﬀort, a simple
rearrangement of terms in his lifetime utility translates this problem into a standard repeated
moral hazard. As a consequence, the optimal consumption proﬁle is observationally equivalent
to that of a related problem without persistence. This suggests that the presence of persistence
does not necessarily change the properties of optimal contracts.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D30, D31, D80, D82.
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I nm a n yr e a ll i f es i t u a t i o n s ,t h ea c t i o n st h a ta g e n t st a k ea tap o i n ti nt i m eh a v el o n gl a s t i n g
consequences, aﬀecting the productivity of their future actions. Such persistence must be taken
into account in a repeated agency relationship when designing the optimal contract. A health
insurance provider knows that unhealthy habits throughout the years predetermine its clients
health to be very weak, making later eﬀorts to preserve it rather ineﬀective. In any kind of job
in which there is learning by doing there is an obvious interest in making the agent work hard
in the initial periods. The common feature of these environments is that current eﬀort has an
eﬀect on the distribution of current and future outcomes. This persistence is a key diﬀerence
between this model and the standard repeated moral hazard problem.
Without persistence, outcome realizations are independent of previous actions, making in-
centives to deviate in a given period depend only on the continuation contract. Although
the contract depends on past history, all the relevant information can be summarized in one
variable, the continuation utility promised to the agent in each period. This feature makes
it possible to write the repeated moral hazard in a recursive way (see [10]), simplifying the
analysis and computation of the optimal contract .T h e r ei sa ne x t e n s i v el i t e r a t u r et h a ts t u d i e s
the characteristics of eﬃcient allocations of consumption and work eﬀo r ti na ne c o n o m yw i t h
moral hazard (see [2],[8] and [6]). Introducing persistence of eﬀort is not a straightforward
generalization since the methods used for the standard case do not easily extend to this setup.
So far there is no clear understanding of how the characteristics of the optimal consumption
1path change with the presence of persistence.
Fernandes and Phelan [3] provide the ﬁrst recursive treatment of agency problems with eﬀort
persistence. In their paper, the current eﬀort of the agent aﬀects output in the same period and
in the following one. Their setup is characterized by three parameters: the number of periods
that the eﬀect of eﬀort lasts for, the number of possible eﬀort levels and the number of possible
outcome realizations. All three parameters are set to two and this makes their formulation and
their computational approach feasible. The curse of dimensionality applies whenever any of
the three parameters is increased. Moreover, no results are given in their paper on how the
properties of the optimal contract diﬀer from the case without persistence.
Mukoyama and Sahin [5] show in a two period contract with two possible levels of eﬀort
t h a ti fp e r s i s t e n c ei sh i g hi tm a yb eo p t i m a lf o rt h ep r i n c i p a lt op e r f e c t l yi n s u r et h ea g e n ti n
the ﬁrst period. Our results imply that their result will not hold in general when allowing for
a continuum of eﬀort choices.
In this paper we show that whenever the utility of the agent is linear in eﬀort and each
period’s outcome distribution is a function of a distributed lag of past eﬀorts, persistence is
not a major complication. With a simple rearrangement of the terms in the expression for
the lifetime utility of the agent, we show that the optimal sequence of consumption and eﬀort
recommendations can be easily recovered from the solution of a related standard repeated
moral hazard. The sequence of contingent consumptions is a solution for both the auxiliary
and the original problem, making them observationally equivalent. This means that, under
2our assumptions, the optimal sequences of consumption in problems with persistence have the
same properties as the ones in problems without persistence, and the results found so far in
the literature apply also to the more realistic setup studied here. Persistence, however, induces
t h ep r i n c i p a lt of r o n tl o a dm o s to ft h ee ﬀort requirements in the ﬁrst period, asking the agent
to simply provide little increments in the following periods to compensate for the diminishing
eﬀect of the initial eﬀort.
2M o d e l
Consider a problem of repeated moral hazard where the eﬀort carried out by the agent each pe-
riod aﬀects current and future output distributions. Assume the agent has additively separable
utility that is linear in eﬀort:
U (ct,e t)=u(ct) − et,
where ct is consumption, with ct ∈ R+ ∀t, and et denotes eﬀort, with et ∈ R ∀t. Assume u is
strictly concave.
Let Yt = Y = {y1,y 2,...,yn} be the set of possible outcomes each period. Let Y t = Πt
τ=0Yτ,
with typical element yt =( y0,y1,...,yt), denote the set of histories of outcome realizations
up to time t. The history of outcomes is assumed to be common knowledge. To capture the
persistence of eﬀort, the distribution of output is a function of all past eﬀorts, et = e1,e 2,...,e t,
and is denoted by π(yi|et). We assume π(yi|et) > 0 for all yi ∈ Y and all et.
















At period zero, the principal chooses the level of eﬀo r tt ob ei m p l e m e n t e da te a c hp o i n ti nt i m e
and for each possible history of outcomes. Consumption is given as a contingent transfer to the
agent in order to provide the necessary incentives.
The timing is as follows: at time zero, the agent accepts or rejects the contract oﬀered by
the principal. If he accepts, at the beginning of any period t h ec h o o s e st h ea m o u n to fe ﬀort
he wants to exert. Output yt is realized according to the distribution determined by the eﬀort
choices up to time t, and the corresponding amount of consumption ct (yt) is given to the agent.
Let Π(yt|et (yt−1)) =
Qt
τ=1 π(yi|eτ (yτ−1)) denote the probability of history yt for a given
sequence of functions {eτ (yτ−1)}
t
τ=1.L e tEU (C) denote the expected utility of the agent from


























To complete the description of the problem, we now turn to the principal’s preferences and
objective function. Assume the principal is risk neutral and designs the contract C in order
to maximize the expected discounted cash ﬂow given by the diﬀerence between the output and
























As usual, the principal faces participation and incentive constraints. The Participation Con-
4straint (PC) makes sure the initial expected utility of the agent in the contract is at least as
large as his outside utility U:
EU (C) ≥ U. (PC)
The Incentive Constraint (IC) makes sure that the agent does not have a proﬁtable deviation,
i.e. the sequence of eﬀort levels recommended by the principal must be a solution to the











The set of possible deviations of the agent is extremely large, given by sequences of functions
mapping histories of outcomes into levels of eﬀort. Unlike in a standard repeated moral hazard
problem, there is no recursive representation making the IC a per-period constraint on the level
of eﬀort. Persistence means that, for a given continuation contract, incentives for deviation at
a certain period may depend on the actual sequence of eﬀorts chosen by the agent up to that
point. In consequence, we need to check for the possibility of joint deviations involving eﬀort
choices in more than one period; this complicates the computation of the optimal contract.
However, as we now show, the problem with persistence can be translated into a standard
repeated moral hazard, where the usual recursive tools can be used to derive the optimal con-
tract.1 In order to do this, we assume the distribution of outcomes depends on the depreciated
1Even without the assumption of linear disutility of eﬀort there exists a recursive formulation of the problem.
However, the characterization of the problem becomes complicated due to the fact that the value function of
the principal depends on three state variables. Carrying extra state variables makes the preferences of the agent
5sum of past eﬀorts. Let δ ∈ (0,1) b et h er a t ea tw h i c ht h ee ﬀect of eﬀort on the distribution
of outcomes decreases. For a sequence et =( eτ)
t







The probability distribution over the outcomes is given by π(yt|st). We use st to denote the
history up to time t. The results in this paper are valid whenever the dependence of st on the
history of eﬀorts is linear, so that the eﬀect of et in any future period can be accounted for in
t independently of the values of future variables. In particular, the value of the depreciation
factor δ could be changing over time and the result would still hold.
With this assumption the problem of the principal can be restated in terms of this sum




















Since st is a linear combination of past eﬀorts we can also write the expected utility of the
agent in terms of this variable. Given that et = st − (1 − δ)st−1, we now rewrite the expected
over continuation contracts known on the equilibrium path. This is done in the same spirit as in the recent
papers analyzing moral hazard problems with unobserved savings (see Á. Ábrahám and N. Pavoni: “Eﬃcient
Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending.” Mimeo, University College London (2003)
































Given the linearity of the disutility function, a rearrangement of terms in the expression for
the expected utility in the PC and the IC comes then very naturally, simplifying the problem
enormously: the terms in which an s with the same time index enters the expression above can






































































































By simple inspection of the above problem it becomes apparent that the solution for the
optimal sequence of st is also a solution for the optimal eﬀort in a repeated moral hazard
problem without persistence in which the marginal disutility of eﬀort is (1 − β (1 − δ)).T h i s
related moral hazard problem can be thought of as an auxiliary problem to ours, since it can
2Without loss of generality, it is assumed that s0 =0 .
7be easily solved and used to learn about the properties of the solution to the problem with
persistence.
Denote the solution for eﬀort in the auxiliary problem as {˜ et}
∞
t=1 . The sequence of optimal
contingent recommendations for s in the problem with persistence will be the same as the
recommendations for ˜ e in the related repeated moral hazard, and the sequence of contingent
consumption will be exactly the same in both problems. Using the deﬁnition of s we can recover
the corresponding sequence of eﬀort levels for the problem with persistence:
e1 = s1 =˜ e1,
e2 = s2 − (1 − δ)s1 =˜ e2 − (1 − δ)˜ e1
. . .
et = st − (1 − δ)st−1 =˜ et − (1 − δ)˜ et−1 ... (1)
In a repeated moral hazard the sequence of required eﬀort will typically be fairly smooth.
This, together with the equivalence just established, implies that, under the assumption of
linear disutility of eﬀort, if there is persistence it is optimal for the principal to ask the agent
to make most of the eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. If δ is small enough, the agent will be asked to
accumulate a given certain level of human capital, and in the following periods he will simply
h a v et op r o v i d el i t t l ei n c r e m e n t st oc o m p e n s a t ef o rt h et a p e r i n go ﬀ of the eﬀect of the ﬁrst
eﬀort.
Note that, as in any repeated moral hazard problem with linear disutility of eﬀort, absent
al o w e rb o u n do ne ﬀort, the auxiliary problem may have either a trivial solution, in which
8the agent always deviates and chooses a very negative level of ˜ e, or no solution, if we were
considering a social planner’s problem in which negative eﬀort is the most eﬃcient way of
providing the agent with utility. The standard approach in the literature is to impose a non
negativity constraint on per period eﬀort: ˜ et ≥ 0 for all t.3 To preserve our equivalence result,
the corresponding restriction in our original problem with persistence is st ≥ 0 for all t. This
guarrantees that the conclusions from our analysis do not apply only to a vacuous class of
problems.4
From the set of equations in (1) we see that drops in the value of s from one period to the
next could imply negative eﬀort levels; the non negativity constraint on s, however, imposes
an endogenous lower bound on e. Also, we could always ﬁnd examples for which eﬀort stays
in positive values. Any problem for which the sequence of ˜ et is bounded above and below can
be mapped into a persistence problem for which depreciation is high enough as to never imply
negative eﬀort.
An important implication of the relation we established between the problem with persis-
tence and the auxiliary one is that the sequence of contingent consumption will be exactly
the same in both problems. This makes the two problems observationally equivalent. The
results found in the moral hazard literature about the long run distribution of utilities and
the individual consumption paths will also hold in our environment with persistence and linear
3For some examples of papers that assume linear disutility of eﬀort, see [1], [4], [7], or [9].
4We thank an anonimous referee for pointing out this problem in an earlier version of the paper.
9disutility.5
The more general case of convex disutility of eﬀort would diﬀer from the one studied here
mainly because the marginal disutility of eﬀort that the agent equates throughout the periods
varies when considering a deviation. The closer the disutility is to linear, however, the less
important the change in marginal disutility, and the more the contract will resemble the one
described here.
3C o n c l u s i o n
The moral hazard literature has pointed out repeatedly the importance of generalizing the
current models of asymmetric information to setups in which either the hidden endowment of
the agent or the eﬀect of the agent’s eﬀort are correlated in time. In this note we ﬁnd a particular
modelling of temporal persistence of the agent’s eﬀort that allows us to very simply characterize
the optimal contract. Under the assumption of linear disutility of eﬀort, we show that when
output depends on a distributed lag of past eﬀorts the optimal contingent consumption is
identical to the one obtained in a related moral hazard problem without persistence. We
conclude that persistence does not necessarily change the properties of the optimal contract.
5See [10], [8], [6], and [2].
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